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REWRITING FAIR USE AND THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT REFORM
MICHAEL J. MADISON*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Well over fifty years have passed since a panel of the Second
Circuit called the doctrine of fair use “the most troublesome in the
whole law of copyright.”1 Like all the king’s horses and all the
king’s men, generations of scholars, judges, and lawyers have
struggled since to make sense of fair use,2 with little success. In
articles published earlier, I offered some lengthy criticisms of fair
use and proposals for how judges, in particular, might make better
use of it.3 This Essay distills those proposals into a different form.
I offer not merely to reinterpret the fair use doctrine, but to
rewrite the fair use statute.
The judges of a generation ago were wrestling with fair use as
it had come to them since Folsom v. Marsh,4 a judge-defined
concept in a statutory domain. Nearly thirty years ago, fair use was
codified for the first time. Yet today, the doctrine is no less
troublesome, and in some ways, it is worse. Even in light of
extensive judicial interpretation, the gaps, overlaps, ambiguities,
and inconsistencies in the statutory text prompt even one of the
leading members of the copyright bar to view the fair use statute
with equal parts despair5 and admiration.6 This Essay briefly
* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Email:
madison@law.pitt.edu. Copyright  2005 Michael J. Madison. This Essay was prepared in
connection with a presentation at the Modest Proposals 2.0 conference in February 2005 at
Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Many thanks to Justin Hughes for
the invitation to participate in that conference, and to Ruth Okediji, Alec French, and Gigi
Sohn for commenting on this proposal.
1 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
2 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659
(1988); Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990); LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR
USE IN COPYRIGHT (1978); William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory
Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639 (2004); Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd.,
292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).
3 See Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525 (2004) [hereinafter Madison, Patterns]; Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and
Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998) [hereinafter Madison, LegalWare].
4 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (D. Mass. 1841).
5 See David Nimmer, ”Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 282 (Winter/Spring 2003) (“By now, we have come far enough to
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recounts the key dimensions of the current problem and suggests a
route to repairing the statute.
Because I am well-aware that any proposal to comprehensively
redraft Section 107 of the Copyright Act is a non-starter in practical
terms, in truth I am using the fair use question to introduce a
specific theme into discussions of copyright reform more generally.
That theme is this: like all law, copyright has to work out the
relationship between its own formal structures, on the one hand,
and the informal structures of social life, on the other, and it has to
do so both in its day-to-day application and in its formal framing.
One way to do that is to focus, as copyright conventionally has
done, on “authors” and “works” and markets. I suggest that in
many respects copyright is better understood in terms of practices
and processes, that is, in terms of how creative things are produced
as well as in terms of who does the producing and what is
produced. Fair use is one place in the law where an explicit shift in
emphasis with that end in mind would be valuable, both in
rationalizing the history of the doctrine and in making it more
sensible prospectively.
II.

THREE FAIR USE PROBLEMS

Theoretical and policy debates underlying fair use are not my
focus, but they are inevitably part of framing the problem. In
abstract terms, fair use matters to copyright law, and to innovation
and information law, because fair use has come to embody many of
the most important conceptual limits on the seeming absoluteness
of copyright. Fair use marks the precious and elusive line between
the future and the present, and between the good of the many and
the good of the one, that exists for reasons of justice, fairness,
utility, or otherwise. The world is a better place in some small
measure because fair use enables it to be so. Fair use also matters
concretely, at least so long as society takes seriously the notion that
copyright is a system of limited rights and interests. Other limits
on copyright’s scope, such as the idea/expression distinction, the
first sale doctrine, and the term of copyright, have come under
such sustained attack that they are widely viewed, in practical
realize that, pious words notwithstanding, it is largely a fairy tale to conclude that the four
factors determine resolution of concrete fair use cases.”).
6 See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1275
(2004) (“As much as transparency gains in allowing advance planning of one’s affairs,
more is lost by sacrificing the ability to achieve justice in each of the foregoing cases as well
as countless others. For these reasons, Congress has deliberately sacrificed transparency in
the interest of equity.”).
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terms, as unimportant. The idea/expression distinction is almost
impossibly elusive; licensing of digital content presses the first sale
doctrine nearly to the breaking point; and in Eldred v. Ashcroft7 the
Supreme Court determined that Congress has nearly unlimited
discretion in setting copyright’s duration. Fair use appears to be
the battleground state of copyright politics. To paraphrase Lloyd
Weinreb, fair use embodies the true meaning of copyright8—
whatever that is.
Both abstractly and concretely, however, fair use has been
spectacularly unsuccessful as a substantive player in copyright
theory and practice. The persistence and variety of copyright
disputes over fair use strongly suggest that in the practice of
creativity and innovation the doctrine has failed to fulfill its
liberating premise. There are three classes of problems in
contemporary fair use debates; I draw examples from each one.
The first sort of problem is what might be called “classic” fair
use, or what the dissenters in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios9 characterized as the unauthorized but nonetheless
“productive” use of copyrighted works.10 For example, the Center
for Social Media at American University recently released a report
summarizing an extensive series of interviews with documentary
filmmakers, which indicted the copyright-owning community and
copyright law in general for failing to adequately enable
filmmakers to make “productive” use of copyrighted audio and
video excerpts as part of documentary films.11 There is little doubt
that copyright law should enable so-called “productive” fair use.
There is little agreement, however, on what constitutes
“productive” use or on when seeking permission to make such use
should be excused.
The second sort of problem is what might be called “pure”
personal use, descended from the time-shifting of broadcast
television programs that was implicitly recognized as fair use by the
Sony majority. The legitimacy of “personal” use of peer-to-peer file
sharing systems and of the TiVo “personal” digital video recorder
falls into this category.12 Notwithstanding Sony, there is broad
7
8
9
10
11

537 U.S. 186 (2003).
See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1292 (1999).
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary
Filmmakers (November 2004), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/
backgrounddocs/printable_rightsreport.pdf
12 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004), rev’d, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.
2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The legality of
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debate concerning whether fair use is ever an appropriate
copyright concept for mediating “personal” concerns, such as
individual privacy and autonomy.
In between these two, there is a third problem, what might be
called “personal productive use.”13 Here, “mere” individuals (as
opposed to professional or trained creators) exercise some of the
kinds of editorial or creative discretion that classically characterizes
the “creative” or “productive” end of the fair use spectrum. One
example is the recent controversy over the sale and rental of prerecorded DVDs that omit content believed to be objectionable to
some consumers—but without the permission of the films’
producers, directors, or copyright owners.14 Related technology
would enable consumers to skip objectionable content on
unedited DVDs. The point of the technology is to enable
“personal use” of the copyrighted work (if you bought, borrowed,
or rented a DVD legitimately, you should be able to watch the parts
you want to, and not watch the parts that you don’t want to), but
this is customized or arguably creative personal use (the resulting
“edited” film may closely resembled a version edited for television
broadcast).
The difficulty with this third problem is that it seems to reverse
the typical copyright equation. Usually, to the extent that using
such technology is characterized as “productive use,” it would seem
more plausibly to be “fair” use. “Mere” personal use might be
treated differently. In this instance, however, the positions of the
parties are reversed—a situation that may become more frequent
as tools and practices of creativity expand beyond traditional
creative communities. In disputes that fall into the “personal
productive use” category, consumers argue that the use constitutes
“mere” personal (i.e., consumptive) use, and copyright owners
contend that it constitutes “creative” reuse, and that it crosses the
line that separates fair use from unauthorized preparation of a
the TiVo has not been litigated. In conceptually similar cases, different federal trial courts
have determined that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibited selling software
that enabled making backup copies of DVDs, see 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and copyright law prohibited the
unauthorized operation of an Internet-based digital music storage and retrieval system. See
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
13 See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 40720(2003).
14 The leading companies in this “Edited Hollywood movie” market are CleanFlicks,
which rents “edited” films, see CleanFlicks It’s About Choice!, http://www.cleanflicks.com
(last visited August 25, 2005), and ClearPlay, which distributes filtering technology that
works with DVD players. See ClearPlay, http://www.clearplay.com (last visited August 25,
2005).
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derivative work. Which framing of the dispute is the right one?15
The law lacks clear criteria for choosing, just as in the first two sorts
of problems, it lacks a clear vocabulary for deciding the case on the
merits.
I have argued that courts have better tools for dealing with
these problems than they are usually given credit for,16 but even in
the best of worlds, courts are slow. How has the legislative process
responded? Congress’s approach has been to undertake mostly
incremental changes in response to particular concrete problems.
In particular, Congress has addressed the distinction between
“productive” use and “personal” use by trying to cabin “personal”
use tightly so that it does not engulf all reproduction, distribution,
and modification of consumer-oriented copyrighted material.
Thus, in the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) of 1992,
Congress created a limited exemption from liability for “the
noncommercial use by a consumer of [a limited class of digital
audio recording devices] for making digital musical recordings or
analog musical recordings.”17 Efforts to protect consumer use of
technology to display edited DVDs have tied exemptions to use of
such technology as private use, in the household, serving only that
household,18 in effect making sure that “personal” means “one
family and one family only.” Proposed legislation that would
regulate or even ban file sharing technologies outright have
likewise focused on distinctions between “private” and “public”
use.19 Recent Congressional efforts to address the “productive use”
side of the divide consist of excruciatingly detailed exceptions to
liability under the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital
15 Wendy Gordon recently suggested that copyright law look to distinguish the
“expressive” user from the “instrumentalist user” in a variety of contexts. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75,
79, 88 (2004). Her project—acquiring “a better conceptual map of the generative process
and the mix of incentives that serve it,” id. at 75—is similar to mine, though she doesn’t
offer much detail regarding how to apply her distinction in practice, and (in contrast to
mine) it remains resolutely individualistic.
16 See Madison, Patterns, supra note 3, at 1645-65.
17 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000).
18 The Family Movie Act protects distribution of DVDs edited by CleanFlicks and
distribution of ClearPlay viewing technology. See Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-9, § 201, 119 Stat. 223 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 110(11) (West 2005)).
19 The proposed Author, Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Security
(ACCOPS) Act of 2003 would have criminalized “the placing of a copyrighted work,
without the authorization of the copyright owner, on a computer network accessible to
members of the public who are able to copy the work through such access.” See H.R. 2752
(108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2004)). Efforts to “liberalize” fair use under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act have proposed related steps, enumerating situations where circumventing
technological protection measures would be lawful. See Digital Choice and Freedom Act of
2002, H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. §§ 3-4 (2002); Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003,
H.R. 107, 108th Cong. § 5(a) (2003).
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Millennium Copyright Act.20 Otherwise, the question is left for
development in the courts.21 But anxiety about unpredictable
outcomes is leading to pressure to define “productive” as well. The
problem of documentary filmmaking has prompted discussion of
two statutory models, one a sort of safe harbor for re-use of certain
amounts of copyrighted material, the other a centralized content
clearinghouse for audio-visual materials, similar to the Copyright
Clearance Center for periodicals and other text.22
In both “personal” and “productive” use examples, actual and
proposed legislative reform has avoided the fair use statute
entirely, treating it as all but useless as written. Since the
complexity of the copyright statute already compares unfavorably
to the tax code, it seems unwise to “solve” fair use by adding more
details to the statute. Among other things, this is the lesson of the
AHRA. As the technological innovation that prompted passage of
the AHRA was rejected by the marketplace, the “personal use”
exemption added in 1992 has been relegated to what amounts to a
copyright ghetto.23 If fair use is to mean anything substantive, and
if statutory reform is to enable it to do so, then the task is not to
tinker with its details, but to rewrite fair use itself.24
III.

AN IDEAL SOLUTION

The current problem, in other words, is the emptiness of
Section 107. What do I mean by “emptiness”? I mean that the
statute itself has become not the embodiment of copyright’s
blended nature, as Professor Weinreb argued, but a placeholder
for all manner of arguments about limits, many of which have little
to either with “productivity” or “personal use,” without doing much
at all to help courts, lawyers, litigants, and plain old ordinary folk
reason their way to solutions. It’s what prompted Professor Lessig
20

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(d)-(i) (2000).
In mid-2005, the Librarian of Congress appointed a “Section 108 Study Group” to
examine whether and how Section 108 of the Copyright Act, which provides certain
exceptions and limitations to libraries and archives, might be revised to account for digital
media.
22 See Untold Stories, supra note 11.
23 The section has been addressed only once by appellate courts. See Recording Indus.
Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting
relevance of section 1008, in dicta, in opinion deciding that manufacturer of portable
device for playback of mp3 computer files was not required to comply with technical and
administrative requirements of the AHRA).
24 My approach under American law contrasts with the European method, which has
been to itemize exceptions and limitations at great length. See Council Directive 2001/29/
EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L167/10).
21

R
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to characterize fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer,”25 and it’s the
problem of the supplicant who crawls his way to the top of the
mountain to seek wisdom and spiritual guidance from the seer and
who asks, above all else, “What is fair use?”26 Fair use has become
too many things to too many people to be of much specific value to
anyone.
I don’t suppose that repairing Section 107 will resolve the
political and structural forces that seek highly specified “solutions”
to fair use controversies, rather than content for the emptiness. I
do believe, however, that revising the statute can narrow the range
of fair use issues that courts seem to be incapable of resolving on a
systematic basis; that lawyers, as a result, are incapable of analyzing
systematically for purposes of advising their clients; and that,
finally, end up in the legislative hopper. As a matter of seat-of-thepants comparative institutional analysis, Congress is the wrong
body to be making fine-grained fair use judgments. If Congress
wants to avoid that responsibility, however, it should build into the
statute a mechanism not only for keeping and resolving fair use
cases at the grass roots level, but for building a body of fair use law
that is sufficiently stable that it resists both light to moderate
pressure for legislative relief with respect to “little” fair use
problems. A better statute won’t resolve all of the problems
currently presented under the banner of fair use. Some of those
problems don’t belong in fair use in the first place and should be
dealt with elsewhere in the Copyright Act—as problems of first sale
under Section 109, or of the distinction between intangible “works
of authorship” and tangible “copies,” under Section 202, or of the
definition of “copies” under Section 101, for example, or “works of
authorship” under Section 102. Fair use has been used, perhaps
wrongly, as a stalking horse for broader philosophical concerns.27
Each and all of these are intellectual swamps, ready to be
recharacterized metaphorically and put to productive use as
valuable wetlands.
Here, I can tackle only fair use. Repairing Section 107 would
involve more than reworking the syntax of the statute (though the
25

LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
CREATIVITY 287 (2004).
a cartoon reproduced in MELVILLE B. NIMMER, ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT
LITIGATION AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 504 (5th ed. 1998).
27 Rebecca Tushnet argued recently that fair use is a poor vehicle for First Amendment
values, since the First Amendment recognizes an autonomy interest in out-and-out copying
of copyrighted works that may be in fundamental tension with the promotion of “creative”
re-use as fair use. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
26 The quotation is the cutline from
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syntactical problems are important). Giving Section 107 content
means engaging in a process of reimagination. That process has, I
believe, at least three steps: First is to appreciate what practice has
revealed about the problems with and goals of Section 107.
Second is to imagine what an idealized version of fair use would
look like, bearing in mind what we know has worked well in
practice, and what has worked badly. Third, and finally, is to
consider whether and how to move from the current problematic
text to something approximating the idealized version.28
A.

Inventorying the Goals and Defects of Section 107

What is fair use designed to do? There are, broadly speaking,
two answers to this question. One answer focuses on the exclusive
rights reserved to the copyright owner, and it ties fair use to
circumstances where unauthorized use doesn’t really injure the
value associated with those rights. Narrow versions of this
argument focus on alleged “market failures,” in which the
copyright owner might not be willing to give permission for use of
the work in legitimate circumstances;29 other versions focus on
balancing the economic value of the copyright owner’s interest and
the economic value of the putative infringer’s interest;30 still others
cast a wider net, trying somehow to balance the value of the
copyright interest against the social value of the use.31
The second answer more directly confronts the good to be
served by allowing unauthorized use in certain circumstances. The
standard may be phrased generally, as the Supreme Court
confirmed in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., so that fair use is
intended to apply in circumstances where liability “would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”32 Or, fair use
may be one place in copyright where courts should find affirmative
expression of the values underlying the First Amendment.33
Professor Fisher has mused that fair use may play a significant role
in helping society to achieve “a substantive conception of a just and
attractive intellectual culture.”34 And at the end of the day, above
28 The technique isn’t mine. I’ve borrowed it from BARRY NALEBUFF AND IAN AYRES,
WHY NOT?: HOW TO USE EVERYDAY INGENUITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS BIG AND SMALL (2003).
29 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2.
30 See, e.g., Patry & Posner, supra note 2.
31 See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 2.
32 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
33 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220, (2005) (referring to fair use as a
“traditional First Amendment safeguard” and citing the Court’s opinion to that effect in
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
34 See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1744.

R
R
R
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all things fair use should strive to be, well, fair.35
The problem with the first answer is that try as they might, its
adherents cannot avoid its inevitable recourse to both rhetoric and
substantive analysis that depend on the marketplace. Fair use is an
exception to the presumption that the copyright owner should
control markets for the work. If an exception is claimed, it should
be first measured against markets, both existing and future.36 If a
market transaction is feasible, then the rule is (or should be) that
the copyist should pay the copyright owner’s price. On this
reading, as observers have noted, as expanding technology and
reduced cost facilitates more market transfers, fair use tends to
diminish. Fair use has no normative bite. It exists as the market
allows it to. In this case, there is little reason for hue and cry over
inadequacy of the fair use doctrine or the fair use statute, though
one might simplify matters considerably by either eliminating the
doctrine entirely or reducing the statutory text to forcing
consideration solely of the effect of the defendant’s use on the
market for the owner’s work.37 Of the current four fair use
“factors,” only this one factor is really important.
Alternatively, some who offer a market or economic balancing
answer insist that some market “failures” will be sufficiently
persistent (such as an author’s reluctance to license the work of the
critic, or the injustice of allowing a first author to capture the
economic value associated with a genuinely “transformative” use by
a second) that fair use is needed to remedy the situation and allow
the use to proceed. Formulations of the first answer at times
include exceptions of this sort. In that case, market and
economically-oriented justifications turn out to be, in truth,
normative visions of fair use constituted by the premise that some
uses of copyrighted works should proceed just because we think
that they should, whether or not some actual or fictive “market” is
injured.38
35 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 179-84 (2001) (advocating a return to a
copyright framework that is comprehensible to ordinary consumers); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (1990)
(concluding that fair use remains, ultimately, an appeal to fairness).
36 Wendy Gordon’s recent proposal to look to “expressive” use is a move away from
defining privileged use negatively. See Gordon, supra note 15. If Rebecca Tushnet is right
about the expressive virtue of pure reproduction of others’ work, see Tushnet, supra note
27, then it’s not clear that the proposal, as such, really avoids dependence on market
constructs.
37 For an example of a proposal that tends to point in this direction, see Molly Shaffer
Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (2005).
38 See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of
the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297 (2004).

R
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I am unapologetically in the second camp to begin with, so I
welcome this revision to the economic story. But the second
answer to the fair use problem is no perfect solution. Even if
courts have been deciding cases based on an unarticulated
normative vision of the good, the standards that they have used—
”is the plaintiff stifling creativity?” (translated by the Court in
Campbell as “did the defendant ‘transform’ the plaintiff’s
work?”39)—are just short of useless as substantive guides to
behavior and decision-making.40
The difficulty is finding a way in the statute to articulate the
premise that fair use shelters use of copyrighted material in
circumstances where we are willing simply to disregard economic
injury claimed by the copyright owner, and to do so in a way that is
both syntactically and substantively coherent.
Syntactically, the defects in the fair use statute are all too clear.
Notwithstanding David Nimmer’s conclusion that Section 107 is
perfectly fine as written,41 the truth is that the text is all but
incoherent. Section 107 characterizes its subject matter as “fair
use,” though this is an exception to liability under Title 17, and
Title 17 otherwise sets liability in the context of “reproduction,”
“distribution, “public display,” and so on—not in the context of
“use.” Section 107 begins with a preamble that identifies what
appear to be paradigmatic or exemplary “fair uses,” but nowhere
does the text provide that these things (“news reporting,”
“criticism”) are to be regarded presumptively as non-infringing or
even that they should guide decision-making. The statute offers
four “factors” that courts may consider when evaluating a claim of
fair use, yet it doesn’t explain how those factors relate to the list of
exemplary uses, or to each other. Depending on the facts of the
case, the factors may be redundant, or inconsistent, or possibly
39 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will
be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use.”).
40 There is certainly something to the notion that the law should track intuitive senses
of “fairness,” but common or intuitive fairness as such is both too broad and too narrow a
basis for framing fair use. It’s too broad for the oft-cited reason that anything, framed
appropriately, might be alleged to be “fair.” It’s too narrow in the sense that the three
illustrative cases cited in Part II suggest that our intuitions may not keep up with what are
allegedly “fair” circumstances. The CleanFlicks and file sharing examples are
characterized by widely disparate intuitions. The documentary filmmaking example may
be supported by no popular intuitions whatsoever. Even within the filmmaking
community, there may be a common intuition—that an appropriate licensing regime is
needed—that doesn’t match an arguably “objective” view that this example appears to be a
paradigmatic case for fair use. The appeal to intuition succeeds, though, in calling out the
idea that the concept of fair use should be stable and persistent across time.
41 See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1273-75.
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both. The legislative history urges that the statute be treated as an
extension of the decades-long tradition of judicial discretion in
applying fair use to the case at hand,42 yet it also urges that each
case be treated on a fact-specific basis.43 As to the burden of proof,
the statute indicates that “fair use” is “not an infringement,”
suggesting that the party claiming infringement ought to be
responsible for pleading and/or proving an absence of fair use, but
over the last decade it has become an established rule of practice
that fair use is nothing more than an affirmative defense, waivable
both during the course of a lawsuit, and in advance.44 About the
only reasonably clear text in the statute is its last sentence, added in
1992,45 that purports to clarify that fair use applies to re-use of
unpublished works as well as to published ones. I say “purports”
because the sentence is reasonably clear on its own, but like the
rest of the statute it lacks any clear relationship to the whole.
Substantive defects fall into two groups, one that I characterize
as “external” to the fair use statute, and one that I characterize as
“internal.” Internal problems have to do with the substance of fair
use itself. First, as I noted above, notwithstanding the long history
of fair use, and the abundance of fair use theory, there is no
coherent body of fair use law. Contemporary commercial practice
pushes extremely hard toward copyright markets and toward
minimization or elimination of fair use. Any possible competing
paradigm needs a robust practice behind it.46 Yet there is none,
and the multi-factor standard given in the statute seems calculated
to prevent one from developing. Not all cases of confirmed “fair
use” need to fit a particular, timeless paradigm of acceptability, but
it has been a key failing of Section 107 that courts usually have
treated fair use as a question that arises sui generis. Courts
frequently refuse to treat a new case primarily as similar to or
different from an older case. The result is that arguably fair uses
are systematically disadvantaged. The fair use statute, in other
words, has prevented courts from doing with fair use what courts
do with other legal concepts. Courts have failed to build a
42

See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
See id.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. On the inconsistency between this standard and earlier
practice, endorsed by the Court in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
L. REV. 975, 989 (2002).
45 The amendment was a reaction to the categorical approach concluding that fair use
did not apply to unpublished works, seen in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90
(2d Cir. 1987), and New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1989).
46 See Madison, Legal-Ware, supra note 3, at 1111-32.
43
44
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common law of fair use, one that consists not merely of many cases
applying a common rule, but instead a cluster of cases in which
judges are listening to, echoing, and responding to one another in
articulating their senses of the law.47
External problems have to do with the relationship between
fair use and other copyright doctrines. The substantive emptiness
of fair use makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright
analysis that courts can’t manage in other areas. There is the lack
of clarity in the relationship between Section 107 and other
statutory exceptions to infringement, including Section 110
(special privileges for certain not-for-profit uses); between fair use
and copyright’s compulsory and statutory licenses (Sections 114,
115, 119, and 121); and between the role of fair use in claims for
“copyright infringement” and claims for “circumvention of
technological protection measures” under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. Non-statutory “external” concerns include whether
fair use should be a statutory home for a “de minimis” defense to
infringement;48 the relationship between fair use and substantial
similarity and idea/expression analysis;49 and how fair use should
be treated in analyzing claims of contributory and vicarious liability
for copyright infringement.50 What might be fair use questions are
treated doctrinally as other kinds of questions, muddying the
doctrinal waters elsewhere. Questions better resolved elsewhere
are treated as fair use problems, blurring the proper scope of fair
use.
The most important substantive defect of the text may be its
failure to make any sense out of the problem of aggregating the
allegedly “fair” or “unfair” use of a copyrighted work by an
47 See Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197
(2001) (describing cognitive science understanding of analogical legal reasoning). One
might react not by reinforcing the judicial role, but by reducing it. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk &
Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
41, 65-70 (2001) (proposing a specification for a computer-implemented fair use rights
management system).
48 See Newton v. Diamond, 349 F. 3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that by virtue of
defendant’s de minimis use, the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case of
infringement).
49 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that defendant’s parody of Gone With the Wind was substantially similar to
the original, but that it was so transformative that, in light of First Amendment interests at
stake, a preliminary injunction against its publication was not warranted).
50 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984)
(analyzing fair use interests of users of videocassette recorders); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Brief
of Amicus Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) (cautioning against
adjudicating fair use interests of parties not represented in contributory infringement
litigation).
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individual.51 On the one hand, the statute is concerned with “the
use” of the copyrighted work, and in “the use” the statute clearly
contemplates a focus on the individual defendant and on what the
individual defendant is doing. Proponents of market-oriented
interpretations of fair use tend to seize on this perspective and are
extremely reluctant to let it go.
On the other hand, the statute clearly makes sense only if a
given fair use problem is characterized in social terms as well as in
individual terms. The point is that fair use is fair because the fair
“users” are doing things that society wants done, even if—and possibly
because—everyone does them. The idea of only comparing the value of
the copyright owner’s use to the value of the defendant’s use
(whether done internally, from the perspective of the parties, or
externally, from some “objective” perspective) is incoherent. Once
we assume that the work of authorship is sufficiently creative to
justify protection by copyright, there can be no principled reason
for declaring that the defendant’s work is more worthy, either
because it is somehow “more” creative or because it serves some
other “more important” policy interest, such as privacy or
autonomy. At the level of individual authors, one author is as
deserving as the next, whatever our philosophical baseline for
protection. The second use wins only where society trumps the
individual, and that means that we need some mechanism in fair use
for linking what the individual defendant is doing to what society
gets out of the deal. The typical formal solution to the problem—
declaring that creative re-uses provide third-party benefits that are
systematically incapable of being internalized in two-party
transactions—doesn’t wash as a practical matter.52 Neither courts
nor litigants can take “third party benefits” to the bank unless they
have some structured sense for figuring out what those third party
benefits are.
B.

An Ideal Law of Fair Use

In asking and answering the question: if we were to start from
scratch, what would the law of fair use look like?, I begin by
positing that we need a fair use doctrine of some sort. My position
is mostly intuitive, though it has some support in a recent article by
51
52

See Madison, Patterns, supra note 3, at 1530.
See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000). It’s
not clear that it washes as a formal matter, either, since there is no way to determine
whether and how these alleged third-party effects happen. For what it’s worth, and as a
matter of faith, I am highly sympathetic to the intuition that third-party effects are central
to copyright generally.
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Diane Zimmerman.53 Professor Zimmerman argues that a public
domain of some sort might be a constitutional requirement for
copyright law, a position she finds justified in the First
Amendment, rather than in the Copyright Clause. She doesn’t
address fair use itself, but her argument might be extended just a
bit as follows: fair use is a part of copyright’s public domain,54 and
if there were no fair use statute, a meaningful fair use doctrine
might nonetheless be a constitutional requirement by virtue of the
subtle overlap between copyright law and the First Amendment.
There is support for this proposition, though it is slight, in dicta in
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises55 and in Eldred v.
Ashcroft.56 The idea of repealing Section 107 has a certain
contrarian appeal: so long as Congress specified that the repeal
should not be interpreted as bearing on the merits or substance of
the law,57 the repeal would challenge courts to flesh out the scope
of the First Amendment principle articulated in those cases.
Combining the Court’s comments, the tradition of judiciallyendorsed fair use, and a comprehensive copyright statute that
otherwise sets the odds heavily in the copyright owner’s favor, I
conclude that there seems to be little reason to deny the world a
statute that gives courts a structure for adjudicating cases and
parties some ex ante guidance on what fair use looks like, even if
that guidance, in revised form, remains far from perfect. If fair use
is supposed to stand for something affirmative, we should take our
best shot at stating what it is. A fair use doctrine may or may not be
a constitutional requirement. A fair use statute is a pragmatic
necessity.
53 See Zimmerman, supra note 38. For a more skeptical view of fair use, see John
Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465
(2005) (characterizing fair use as the triumph of an expansive natural law theory of
copyright protection, and arguing that fair use undermines copyright’s essential policy
goal).
54 My reading of the public domain here is an expansive one. See James Boyle, The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33 (2003) (describing different theories of the public domain).
55 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“In view of the First Amendment protections already
embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment
traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use
to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.”).
56 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (noting that “ copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards
are generally adequate to address” First Amendment concerns).
57 Here I allude to the definition of “work made for hire” that appears in the Copyright
Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), which reflects the controversy over Congress’s amending
that definition in 1999 to add sound recordings to the list of works eligible for that
characterization, and the repeal of that amendment in 2000. See David Nimmer & Peter S.
Menell, Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 387, 390-94 (2001).
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Once we have a statute, in general outline it should respond to
the general theoretical and policy concerns distinguished above,
and it should avoid the syntactical and substantive traps of the
current text:
• the statute should confirm circumstances under which
infringing acts will not be treated legally as infringing,
for reasons having to do with the substantive value of
what the defendant is doing and independent of
arguable harm to the copyright owner;
• the statute should be internally syntactically
comprehensible;
• the statute should be structurally coherent with respect
to the balance of the copyright statute;
• the statute should contain or refer to a mechanism for
establishing, building, and relying on a body of
precedent; and
• in order to serve as a suitable tool for planning as well
as adjudication, the statute should incorporate a
mechanism for reconciling individual and group
interests in non-infringing use.
I largely set aside two potentially significant points. First, I
treat fair use as a question of substantive law rather than as a
question of remedies. A handful of cases have suggested that an
allegedly infringing use might be accommodated in the copyright
scheme by a sort of judicial compulsory license: the denial of
injunctive relief, coupled with an award of damages.58 Professor
Zimmerman’s argument suggests a similar distinction. The public
domain is in a sense not fully public if it is governed by a
compulsory license.59
Second, an American scheme of fair use cannot operate in a
vacuum. The United States must be respectful of its international
copyright obligations. Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention allows
for exceptions to the reproduction right in national law, “in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”60 Article 10 of the
58 See New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505-06 (2001); Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). Cf. Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ’g
Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 922 (D. Mass. 1993) (awarding no damages for past infringement,
but enjoining future use). See also Fisher, supra note 2, at 1723-26 (commending
compulsory license solutions to conflicts over copyright entitlements).
59 See Zimmerman, supra note 38, at 366-70.
60 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2), Sept.
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Berne Convention stipulates that any national law of fair use
should be consistent with “fair practice.”61 To the extent that the
current American law of fair use might be in conflict with those
standards,62 I assume that any improvement to the statute that
renders its application more predictable would at least lessen such
a conflict, and it might lead to some harmonization of national
“fair dealing” and “fair use” standards.63
Treating the foregoing stipulations as specifications for a
product, I offer the following idealized fair use implementation:
[1] Exclusive rights in copyright shall not extend to any
use of a copyrighted work that society regularly values
in itself.
This isn’t a legislative proposal. Instead, I have tried to focus on
two points. First, the phrasing addresses my central substantive
concern, that the case for fair use is strongest when the defendant
can persuasively argue that the value of her activity to society
clearly outweighs even stipulated loss to the copyright owner. That
balance tips most sharply in favor of fair use when the defendant is
doing the sort of thing that society wants done regardless of, and
even in spite of, the claim of some rights holder to authorize the
activity. Second, the phrasing addresses the concern that fair use
decision-making is at least unpredictable and at worst arbitrary.
Judicial treatment of fair use as a case-by-case “safety valve” for a
variety of policy, fairness, and/or personal autonomy concerns has
tended, over time, substantially to reduce its usefulness in dealing
with substantive policy concerns, as well as its usefulness in day-today planning in intellectual property economies. If society values
9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, amended Oct. 2, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 (“Berne Convention”). The TRIPs agreement has a similar provision. See
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), art. 13 (“Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
right holder.”).
61 Berne Convention, supra note 60, art. 10.
62 Ruth Okediji argues that the American doctrine of fair use is broader than what the
Berne Convention allows. See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75 (2000).
63 Canadian copyright law, for example, recognizes a right of “fair dealing” in terms
that parallel my proposal. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., c. C-42, Part III (1985) (Can.); § 29
(“for the purpose of research or private study”); § 29.1 (“for the purpose of criticism or
review”); § 29.2 (“for the purpose of news reporting”); see also CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13. In the United Kingdom, the
Copyright, Design and Patents Act (1988) (c. 48) exempts fair dealing “for the purposes of
research or private study” (§ 29); “for the purpose of criticism or review” (§ 30); and “for
the purpose of reporting current events” (§ 30).
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criticism, for example, then as a policy matter the law should
embody a mechanism that consistently recognizes and protects it.
As a matter of simple fairness, too, something that we recognize as
criticism should be treated consistently in the law. Fair use applies
where the defendant is doing something that is regularly valued as
such.
There is one glaring problem with this formulation, and it is a
problem deliberately obscured in my litany of defects with the fair
use statute. Some would say: Even if we can accomplish the
formidable task of figuring out uses of copyrighted material “that
society regularly values in itself,” how should we evaluate those
social values against the presumptive value given the exclusive
rights of the copyright holder? Have I not simply fallen into the
trap that I exposed early on, replacing one problematic balancing
test with another?
I argue that I have not, and I elaborate that argument, and
work toward a more pragmatic version of my proposal, in the final
Part of this Essay.
IV.

REWRITING TODAY’S FAIR USE

The substantive and procedural halves of my idealized
suggestion depend on a single underlying concept, that there exist
social structures that persist over time. In my formulation, I’ve
characterized these as uses that “society values in themselves,” on a
regular basis. “Regularity” captures, cryptically, both the substantive
role of social structures in defining the nature of the individual use
(a fair use is not an idiosyncratic use, but is part of a pattern of
related uses), and the procedural goal of building a body of fair
use jurisprudence (as use that is fair today ordinarily ought to have
been fair yesterday, and should be fair tomorrow). Put more
descriptively, I refer to these patterns as “things that society wants
done,” and things that we recognize society has wanted done
consistently in the past, and is likely to continue to want done
consistently in the future. These structures may be internal or
external to copyright law. They may be internal in the sense that
those things or structures may underlie the production of
additional expressive materials. They may be external in the sense
that the expressive materials in question serve principally as
anchors for valuable behaviors.64 The two aren’t perfectly
64 Fair use as a legal matter may be the policy cousin of the concept of distributed
cognition. See, e.g., Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual
Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (2002); Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the
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separable. My contention is that the history and practice of fair use
in the courts suggests that these things are at the bottom of the fair
use calculus, even if they are not often recognized as such.65 By
making them the explicit focus of fair use, I am trying not to
change the law, but to bring into the open more clearly what I
believe the law has long been about.
What remains, of course, is how to determine when “the social
value of the use” is sufficiently great that the law should privilege it.
When do we know that the defendant is engaged in a pattern or
practice that society wants done, without a copyright owner’s
permission, or even in spite of it? My answer is that demonstrating
the existence of the pattern or practice itself is sufficient to
demonstrate that the sought-after social good exists.
This is the point, then, at which I reject various forms of
balancing. Folsom v. Marsh appears to teach that balancing is
required. According to that case, reproduction of the work is not
infringing based on “the nature and objects of the selections made,
the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.”66 Read as balancing,
the weakness in the Folsom formulation, as in the modern statute, is
that it tends to force a one-to-one comparison of the values of the
original copyrighted work and of the allegedly infringing work, a
comparison that almost never flatters the accused work. The
“transformative use” standard that the Court in Campbell borrowed
from Judge Leval has been interpreted widely, and wrongly, as
validating precisely this approach to fair use. If the defendant’s
work “transforms” the plaintiff’s work, then the defendant wins. It
is possible to use this test to reach sensible results, but the
reasoning in these cases seems tortured, and it’s difficult to
implement the rule on a universal basis. How transformative is
transformative enough? No one ever knows until the appellate
court sings.67
Some meaningful room for fair use emerges only when we
look at Folsom v. Marsh, and the statutory framework that descends
from it, as mandating that we take account of the broader social
contexts in which the accused work was prepared and is being
Wild (1995); Edwin Hutchins, Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends, 37 J. PRAGMATICS 1555
(2005) (describing process of “distributed cognition” in which human thought is
grounded in material practice, rather than mental processes or structures); Madison,
Patterns, supra note 3, at 1682-86.
65 See Madison, Patterns, supra note 3, at 1586-1622.
66 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (D. Mass. 1841).
67 See Nimmer, supra note 5, at 287 n.95.
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consumed. It isn’t enough to conclude that society wants certain
people to do certain “fair” things. Society wants these things done
because of what society gets as a result. Fair use is fair, after all,
because (we assume) that it generates social benefits that the
market can’t otherwise produce.68 This was what Folsom v. Marsh
really counsels, what the statute awkwardly pursues, and what
courts have instinctively understood, even if they have had to
articulate their reasons using the statutory vocabulary. Unlike most
of the other statutory exceptions and limitations on the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner,69 fair use is not a market curative.
Fair use is a knowing departure from the market.
How do we cabin this exception to avoid the problem that any
individual, idiosyncratic use can claim that it’s “not of the market,”
that is, how do we identify a genuine claim of fair use and
distinguish that claim from an argument under some other
(market-oriented) limitation on the rights of the copyright holder?
The answer is to require that the arguably fair individual use be
connected to some social structure. The statutory fair use factors,
“nature of the use,” “nature of the work,” “nature of the portions
used,” and “effect on the market for the work” are each (and all)
somewhat clumsy fact-based proxies for analyzing whether the use
is the sort of thing that we ordinarily associate with market-based
exploitation of the work. Something that we recognize as a social
pattern or social practice, such as criticism and scholarship, exists
and is valued precisely because it is not of the market. Individual
use within that social practice will be constrained by it. Fair use is
an individual use that is credibly tied to some larger, identifiable
social practice. Multi-factor analysis has been a tool to measure the
genuineness of the individual claim, rather than a balancing
technique. Much of the debate about what is “productive” use and
what is “personal” use of a copyrighted work, which I reported via
the three fair use problems of Part II, consists of an argument
about social practices.70
Social practices of this sort are not perfectly accessible, either
to laypersons or to the legal system. Their existence and their
scope are not uncontroverted. They are not eternal. Over time,
they evolve. No fair use doctrine will eliminate litigation over their
68 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
69 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
70 Note that “personal use” drops out of the statute as an independent basis for fair use,
on the likelihood that “privacy” and “autonomy” interests are too broadly and vaguely
defined to serve as social structures or practices that would support fair use under this
proposal.
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meaning, and no doctrine will enable perfect prediction regarding
what is fair and what is not. But they are sufficiently autonomous,
accessible, and durable that they offer a meaningful guide for
achieving the benefits that fair use is meant to offer, whether that is
simple fairness, “the good life,” or creativity of the sort that the
market system may not produce. In response to the anticipated
objection that the proposal wrongly turns lawyers into social
scientists, I note that lawyers are amateur anthropologists as it is,
and lawyers in fair use cases already engage in this sort of analysis
and argument.71 To be clear, my goal is not an algorithm for
perfect and automatic decision-making, but instead a framework in
which system participants can plan their affairs with a reasonable
degree of certainty and courts can access structures that lend their
decisions an acceptable degree of legitimacy. Decision-making
with reference to identified and identifiable social practices offers
such a framework.
I want to push the argument one step further, since to say that
social practices can guide fair use to generate whatever it is that fair
use is meant to offer is to damn my own proposal with faint praise.
The affirmative case for social practices as fair use guideposts is
this: Not only do I believe that there is a strong intuition, shared by
courts and laypersons, that these social structures exist to a large
degree autonomously of the law itself, there is an equal intuition—
backed by some provocative social science research—that the
creativity that the copyright system seeks is generated not only by individuals
(or firms) working alone in “innovation” markets, but emerges almost
inevitably via the practice of socially-defined disciplines.72 That is,
creativity depends on, even requires, the discipline of context.73
The copyright system, it might be argued, encourages creativity not
only by focusing on the end results of creative processes, but by
structuring those processes themselves.74 The dominant process is
the market. Secondary but still important processes are valued but
71 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting the defendant’s service of a report by an expert situating the defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s Barbie doll in the context of contemporary art); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1373 & n.9 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (noting defendant’s use of
expert testimony to situate defendant’s work in context of African-American literature),
rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
72 See Madison, Patterns, supra note 3, at 1677-87.
73 But see Justin Hughes, The Line Between Work and Framework, Text and Context, 19
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 30-32 (2001) (describing American copyright law’s
skepticism about respect for the context of art).
74 Cf. Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 334 (1992)
(noting ambiguity in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service regarding whether
“originality” in a copyright sense refers to “the work produced or . . . the activity producing
it, or some of each.”).
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recognized non-market structures. Courts look to the existence of
those processes in judging claims of fair use. Creators, consumers,
and lawyers can look to their existence in assessing plans. We do
this intuitively as it is. I suggest organizing the statute in the same
way.
In terms of melding this approach with the statute, what
happens next? Given that we can’t simply impose a perfect fair use
statute, nor simply repeal the one we have, what’s the next best
solution? How do we move from an idealized doctrine to a
practical one? Start with the existing text:
[2] Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.75
The goals of the idealized statute can be achieved in part
simply by curing the syntactical problems of the current statute.
References to “use” of the work in Section 107 can be modified to
correspond directly to the acts that constitute infringement –
reproduction, preparation of a derivative work, public
performance, and public display. The exemplary uses in the
preamble are clearly and obviously paradigmatic examples of the
sorts of social practices that the statute was created to protect, and
75

17 U.S.C. 107 (2000).
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thus should be preserved. The four factors identified in the statute
can be re-cast as tests for determining the existence of behavior
that conforms to a valid social practice. In other words, they are
ways in which litigants and courts can test for authenticity. The
confusing character of the “market effect” inquiry under factor
four, and the odd detail of the relevance of publication in the final
sentence, can both be cured by clarifying the relationship of the
four factors to the preamble. Rewriting the statute under these
guidelines yields the following:
[3] It is not a violation of this Title to reproduce, prepare
a derivative work based upon, distribute, display or
perform a work protected under this Title in
connection with criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, research, or any other social
practice. In determining the existence of such a
social practice, the court may take into consideration—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial or nonprofit
nature;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, including its
published or unpublished status;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the market for the
copyrighted work.
Much of the language remains mercilessly awkward.
Removing ambiguities and redundancies, and solving for clarity,
leaves us with:
[4] It is not a violation of this Title to reproduce, prepare
a derivative work based upon, distribute, display or
perform a work protected under this Title in
connection with criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, research, or any other social
practice. In determining the existence of such a
social practice, the court may take into consideration—
(1) the purpose of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount of the work used; and
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(4) the injury to the copyright owner.
Two concerns remain. One is the extent to which the four
factors in fact help the court identify a relevant social practice and
the genuineness of an argument that the use is consistent with such
a practice. I have argued elsewhere that authentic and genuine
practices (including emerging practices that extend from existing
behavior), and a given defendant’s legitimate identification within
that practice, can be established in two ways.76 Both can be
identified linguistically, accordingly to a pattern of language that
defines members of the practice and what participants in the
practice do, and behaviorally, by patterns of activity that define
legitimate conduct within the bounds of the practice. The relics of
the four factors get at these concerns only indirectly. This is no
surprise, considering the fact that the factors were developed by
Justice Story well over one hundred years before modern social
science developed a vocabulary for identifying and studying them
more systematically. Allowing courts to tap into that vocabulary
would be far more productive and reliable than adhering to the
ancient framework merely for the sake of tradition. As a result, the
statute would be more robust if the four-factor test were discarded
in its entirely, and litigants and courts encouraged directly to
pursue an limited anthropological exercise.
The second concern is the absence of a specific mechanism
for reconciling and building a body of fair use law over time, that
is, limiting the specifically case-by-case nature of the doctrine. In
this instance, since I have argued above that the objective is to
build a genuine common law of fair use, I suggest the statute
simply say so. We can borrow language developed elsewhere in
federal law for instructing courts to build a common law, and add
it to the statute as subsection (b).77 The revised text reads as
follows:
[5] (a) It is not a violation of this Title to reproduce,
prepare a derivative work based upon, distribute,
display or perform a work protected under this
Title in connection with criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research,
or any other social practice.
(b) This section shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by
76
77

See Madison, Patterns, supra note 3, at 1623-42.
See Madison, Legal-Ware, supra note 3, at 1138-42.
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the courts of the United States in light of reason
and experience.
Some features of this language bear emphasis. Though I
emphasized that my goal was to rationalize fair use rather than
modify its substantive scope, it is clear that in some respects the
scope of fair use under my proposal is somewhat narrower than it
appears to be today. “Personal use” concerns are not obviously
protected under this revision, since “personal use” may not count
as a “social practice.” I repeat the following premise: Personal use
concerns may belong in the Copyright Act, but they may be better
handled under thoughtful analysis of Sections 109 and 202, for
example, which in different ways deal with concerns regarding
tangible things, and perhaps independently under the First
Amendment.78 The problem of the “productive” personal use is
subsumed under the question of the relevant social practice. But
fair use is not the place for the personal as such.
In other respects, the proposal does broaden the existing
scope of fair use. I have proposed that Section 107 specify that fair
use “is not a violation of this Title,” rather than “is not an
infringement,” which is the current phrasing. This is a knowing
broadening of fair use as currently understood, to encompass
claims under all chapters of Title 17, including Chapter 12, the
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.79 Specifying that fair use is not a violation of Title 17 may also
help to clarify the extent to which enforcement of a contract
limiting rights to make fair use of a copyrighted work is preempted
by the Copyright Act, under Section 301.80 The language should
encourage courts to reconsider the allocation of the burdens of
proof and production in cases in which fair use is argued by the
defense. It seems implausible that the defendant in an
infringement action should bear the burdens of both production
and proof regarding an allegation of fair use. Specifying that fair
use is “not a violation of this Title” is meant to suggest that the
78
79

See Tushnet, supra note 27.
See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 673, 739-40 (2000) (concluding that users’ rights provisions in the DMCA fail to
secure genuine rights for users consistent with policies underlying fair use). Legislation
proposed in the House of Representatives in early 2003 would have amended the DMCA to
provide that it is not a violation of the Act “to circumvent a technological measure in
connection with access to, or the use of, a work if such circumvention does not result in an
infringement of the copyright in the work.” Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003,
supra note 19, at § 5(b)(1).
80 See Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing
shrinkwrap agreement that prohibited reverse engineering of computer program), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 928 (2003).
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plaintiff is not required to plead that the defendant is not
participating in a social practice as defined in this Section. Should
the defendant meet an initial burden of production regarding
Section 107 (by introducing credible evidence of the existence of a
social practice and of the defendant’s conformity with that
practice), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the
defendant’s conduct is in fact infringing, because it is properly
characterized as falling within a market for the plaintiff’s work.81
Some activities that are fairly characterized as social practices,
such as satire, should be clearly protected under this revision,
though they are inconsistently protected under current fair use
doctrine. The fact that my proposal takes this step opens it to
possible criticism: can anything count as a social practice? My
answer is that in theory, anything can, as an initial matter, subject
to the core distinction between activities structured by markets and
activities structured by social practices, and subject to the
important qualification that any particular claim would, in the end,
have to be supported by the evidence.82 In practice there will be
normative boundaries that cut off extreme arguments. Rings of
authentic intellectual property pirates should have no recourse to a
“social practices” claim under Section 107, even though they may
have a colorable claim to be governed by specific social norms,
language, and practice.83 A better response in such a case,
however, would be to conclude that rings of pirates aren’t
authentic social practices, but are in fact market-related
organizations. The initial case cannot be made. At the other end,
there are a number of social practices, such as criticism and
scholarship, where the existence of the practice should rarely be
81 This is consistent with the current understanding of burdens of proof in fair use
litigation. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
82 I have, therefore, intentionally failed to specify either that some social practices
qualify for fair use treatment, and that some do not, or to specify explicitly that the statute
applies to “any other qualifying social practice.” The phrase “social practice” is meant to
constrain on its own. If there is no practice and if the practice is not social in some genuine
sense, then the fair use argument should fail. As a matter of proof, this is not problemfree. Inevitably, there would be cases where a defendant would assert some seemingly
incredible version of a social practice. A court would have to assess the evidence. I fail to
see, however, how this hypothetical state of affairs is any worse than what we live with today,
where any idiosyncratic “use” is arguably characterized as “fair.” The point is not to
implement a perfectly determinable fair use system. The point is to implement a system
that constrains effectively, and that does so by relying on the types of information that we
believe are genuinely relevant to the results that the copyright system is designed to
produce. It is true, however, that the liberal tradition includes deep-seated hostility to
anything that appears to empower groups, and to weaken individual autonomy. See, e.g,
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM71-80 (2001) (describing polarizing effects of groups
facilitated by Internet filtering).
83 See, e.g., Jeff Howe, The Shadow Internet, WIRED 154 (January 2005) (describing culture
of “topsites” that feed file sharing networks).
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contested. The question is whether the use is consistent with the
pattern. That is a judgment that can be made with confidence in a
large number of cases, even without a lawyer’s advice, and often ex
ante. It is a judgment that courts do make in fair use cases, under
the guise of the statutory four-factor approach.84 And it is a
judgment that finds support in a variety of philosophical
perspectives on copyright. A social practices approach can be recharacterized as modeled on a set of presumptions in favor of
certain conduct as fair use and justified in terms of economic
efficiency.85 Or, it may be recharacterized as a form of mutuallyassured copyright destruction, in which the rights of individual
creators and the interests of “fair users” in creative communities
exist in equipoise, each posing such a risk to the interest of the
other that neither possesses a superior right.86
V.

CONCLUSION

I am a copyright optimist, in that I believe that we (creators,
lawyers, consumers, and courts) both should and can find ways to
manage a doctrine of fair use that is both more robust and more
structured than the current appeal to case-by-case equity. It is
difficult for me not to be an optimist in this sense, simply because
the pace of marketplace and technological developments suggest
that fair use is one of the few remaining things that we still need
copyright for. If creators and publishers can secure more than
adequate incentive and reward via contract and “rights
management” technology, copyright quickly becomes little more
than a rhetorical safety net. We’re not at that point yet. But
consigning fair use to copyright’s scrap heap represents another
step in that direction. Instead, fair use should be rescued, and
rebuilt.
I am an optimist, too, in believing that what I have
characterized as a social practices approach to copyright reform
can be productive. Throughout intellectual property law, both
current doctrine and legal tradition already focus, in places, not
only on the “who” and the “what” of innovation, the author or
inventor, and the work and the invention, but also on the “how.”87
84
85
86

See Madison, Patterns, supra note 3, at 1645-65.
See Patry & Posner, supra note 2.
See Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY
347 (1997) (advocating an interpretation of fair use that focuses on creative users “whose
takings comport with customary practices that govern creative activities in the relevant
community”).
87 The emphasis on creative process rather than creative output shows up in the joint
authorship doctrine, see Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000), in the
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At times, focusing on the work or the invention is a useful proxy
for difficulties in measuring creative or innovative processes. But
there are times and places where those processes should be
measured directly.88 Within copyright, a social practices analysis
has possible application well beyond fair use. Other, problematic
limitations on the scope of copyright (including the idea/
expression distinction and first sale, among other things) might
benefit from re-examination using this perspective. Eligibility for
copyright protection (“Is the work ‘original’?”) and boundaries
between copyright and patent, and between copyright and
trademark, similarly invite analysis based on social or disciplinary
context. Outside of copyright, one might close this circle by
drawing a similar conclusion in the theory of the First Amendment.
In this constitutional domain, Frederick Schauer has argued
persuasively for a contextual reading of the First Amendment, one
that measures its scope by the institutional setting of the relevant
speech.89 Even if doctrinal links between the First Amendment
and intellectual property law seem strained to some, conceptual
connections are obvious. Social practices read on institutions, and
institutions read on social practices. At some more abstract level,
my argument may hold promise for integrating theories of
copyright and speech.
I am a copyright realist, in understanding that my rewritten
fair use statute is highly unlikely to influence Congress, let alone be
adopted wholesale. It has been suggested that Section 107 in its
current form represents a purely political compromise, and no
interest in Washington, D.C. has a compelling reason to disrupt
definition of works made for hire, see Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730 (1989), and in at least some approaches to separating art from function in
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, see Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co.,
834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). In patent law, the “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art”
standard for measuring the nonobviousness of inventions invites courts to examine the
manner in which scientific disciplines operate. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). Thanks to Brett
Frischmann for this observation.
88 Some argue that the “real” problem with copyright doctrine is not its failure to
support novel forms of creativity, but its failure to recognize emerging processes of
distribution. It’s not clear to me that the two problems are easily separated. The social
practices approach tends to combine them into one. For other recent examples of what I
would characterize as a social practices perspective on questions of information production
and distribution, see Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 951 (2004) (describing changes in social information practices that underlie
production and distribution of creative content); Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the
Internet—and How to Save It (Working Paper 2005) (describing benefits of “generative
technologies” that support group and recursive creativity).
89 See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256
(2005); Michael Madison, Complexity and Copyright in Contradiction, 18 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 125, 170-71 (2000).
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it.90 But influencing legislators was not my goal. My goal was to
distill, combine, and present two specific substantive reforms to the
law of fair use that in my view clarify and simplify the law far more
than they would change it. Putting those reforms into statutory
form seems to me to be the clearest and most straightforward way
to rationalize this important area of the law and to signal its
importance. Judicial application of the approach is more feasible,
and equally justifiable, even under the current statute. My
continuing hope is that in either case, the presentation can be
used to improve the lot of all those who enjoy the fruits of human
creativity, by improving the law on which they depend.

90 In fact, when this proposal was described to the Modest Proposals 2.0 conference, its
political feasibility received a skeptical response from the perspectives of both contentproducing interests and consumer interests.

